MORAL DEVELOPMENT 

What is moral development?

Historically moral development held that humans were naturally good.  They are self-realizing and self-correcting.  Even if that is more in understanding than in practice, it is something that grows in humans spontaneously along with our bodies, and our mental and social capacities.  As individuals and social beings, humans evolve mature moral conscience and character even with psychological and social impediments that slow this progress or de-rail it for a time.

Eventually this naïve view of humans as evolving virtuous creatures gave way to the harder facts of history and by the mid 20^th century this view did not square with the warring world and holocaust behavior.

In the latter 19^th century moral development was revived as a lively research field led by the cognitive-development approach of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.

Kohlberg died in 1987 and while his work has been criticized, revised, and supplemented, his approach to understanding moral development is still on the front burner of the field.  What he was able to do was remove morality from the notion of humans maturing and learning to behave according to a social ethos.  He concentrated on the role of reason and discriminating emotion in making moral choices.

His cognitive research traces the processes by which children unconsciously, yet self-constructively recreate their own systems of thought and self.  In this process, they resist coercive socializing influences to be able to control their own thinking.  They use these coercive forces to structure their own thoughts.  Cognitive theorists see common sense reasoning as a means of distinguishing between conventional values and a morality based on responsible choices.

Cognitivists like Kohlberg don’t view moral development as simply a maturation process. The stages of moral development do not simply unfold according to a genetic blueprint. For example, while a child must reach a certain level of brain development, say about 10-11, to be able to understand abstract reasoning, that attainment is not sufficient for moral development to take place.  Kohlberg was influenced by John Dewey, a philosopher who is central to humanist thinking, and like him sees learning as experiential.  It is the disequilibrium caused by a new experience that is the motivating force to learn another way to cope with disparate data.  This view of learning helps to overcome the nature/nurture problem in that moral development occurs when the child or person is at the right stage to interact with their environment and adapt their thinking as a result.

This is the crux of Kohlberg’s moral education theory.  Children form ways of thinking through their experiences to come to an understanding of moral concepts like justice, caring, rights, equality and human welfare.  Without new and challenging experiences, there is no moral growth.  Thus “learning” conventional values is merely social adaptation.  Socializing agents (parents and teachers) cannot directly teach new forms of thinking.  He rejected the focus on values and virtues, not only because of a lack of consensus as what they should be, but because in practice people with the same values often behave quite differently.  Instead he considered the way people organize their understanding of virtues, rules and norms and integrated these into a moral choice.  Through his cross-cultural studies he found that basic moral principles are found in different cultures and subcultures around the world.

Moral reasoning is an on going process.  Development, in this process, is not merely the result of gaining more knowledge, but rather consists of a sequence of qualitative changes in the way an individual thinks.  Within any stage of development, thought is organized according to the constraints of that stage.  An individual then interacts with the environment according to their basic understandings of it.  However, the child will at some point encounter information which doesn’t fit into their world view, forcing the child to adjust their view to accommodate this new information.  This process is called equilibration and through equilibration development occurs.

One way to simulate this process is to introduce a “moral dilemma” for discussion. Kohlberg interviewed both children and adolescents about moral dilemmas and uncovered 6 stages of moral development.  Let’s use one to look at his stages.

Heinz Steals the Drug

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer.  There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her.  It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.  The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make.  He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug.  The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost.  He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later.  But the druggist said: “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.”  So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.  Should the husband have done that?

Kohlberg’s Six Stages

Level 1.  Preconventional Morality

Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment Orientation.

The child assumes that powerful authorities hand down a fixed set of rules which he or she must unquestioningly obey.  To the Heinz dilemma, the child typically says that Heinz was wrong to steal the drug because “It’s against the law,” or “It’s bad to steal,” as if this were all there were to it.  When asked to elaborate, the child usually responds in terms of the consequences involved, explaining that stealing is bad “because you’ll get punished.”

Although the vast majority of children at stage 1 oppose Heinz’s theft, it is still possible for a child to support the action and still employ stage 1 reasoning.  For example, a child might say, “Heinz can steal it because he asked first and it’s not like he stole something big; he won’t get punished.”  Even though the child agrees with Heinz’s action, the reasoning is still stage 1; the concern is with what authorities permit and punish.

Kohlberg calls stage 1 thinking “preconventional” because children do not yet speak as members of society.  Instead, they see morality as something external to themselves, as that which the big people say they must do..

Stage 2.  Individualism and Exchange

At this stage children recognize that there is not just one right view that is handed down by the authorities.  Different individuals have different viewpoints.  A child could say “Heinz, might think it’s right to take the drug, the druggist would not.”  Since everything is relative, each person is free to pursue his or her individual interests.  Another could say that Heinz might steal the drug if he wanted his wife to live, but that he doesn’t have to if he wants to marry someone younger and better-looking.  Or one could say that Heinz might steal it because “they had children and he might need someone at home to look after them.  But then maybe he shouldn’t steal it because they might put him in prison for more years that he could stand.”

You might have notice that children at both stages 1 and 2 talk about punishment.  However, they perceive it differently.  At stage 1 punishment is tied up in the child’s mind with wrongness; punishment “proves” that disobedience is wrong.  At stage 2, in contrast, punishment is simply a risk one naturally wants to avoid.

Although stage 2 respondents sometimes sound amoral, they do have some sense of right action.  This is a notion of fair exchange or fair deals.  The philosophy is one of returning favors—“If you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.”  To the Heinz story, subjects often say that Heinz was right to steal the drug because the druggist was unwilling to make a fair deal; he was “trying to rip Heinz off.”  Or they might say that he should steal for his wife “because she might return the favor some day.”

Respondents at stage2 are still said to reason at the preconventional level because they speak as isolated individuals rather than as members of society.  They see individuals exchanging favors, but there is still no identification with the values of the family or community.

Level II. Conventional Morality

Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationships.  At this stage children—who are by now usually entering their teens—see morality as more than simple deals.  They believe that people should live up to the expectations of the family and community and behave in “good” ways.  Good behavior means having good motives and interpersonal feelings such as love, empathy, trust and concern for other.  Heinz, they typically argue, was right to steal the drug because “he was a good man for wanting to her,” and “His intentions were good, that of saving the life of someone he loves.”  Even if Heinz doesn’t love his wife, he should steal the drug because, “I don’t think any husband should sit back and watch his wife die.”

If Heinz’s motives were good , the druggist’s were bad.  Stage 3 subjects emphasize that the druggist was “selfish”, “greedy” and “only interested in himself, not another life.”  Sometimes the respondents become so angry with the druggist that they say he ought to be put in jail.

A typical stage 3 response would go like this:  “It was really the druggist’s fault, he was unfair, trying to overcharge and letting someone die.  Heinz loved his wife and wanted to save her.  I think anyone would.  I don’t think they would put him in jail.  The judge would look at all sides, and see that the druggist was charging too much.”

This subject defines the issue in terms of the actors’ character traits and motives.  He talks about the loving husband, the unfair druggist, and the understanding judge.  His answer deserves the label “conventional morality” because it assumes that the attitude expressed would be shared by the entire community—“anyone” would be right to do what Heinz did.

We see now a shift from the unquestioning obedience of stages 1 and 2 to a relativistic outlook and to a concern for good motives. 

Stage 4.  Maintaining the Social Order.  Stage 3 reasoning works best in two-person relationships with family members or close friends, where one can make a real effort to get to know the other’s feelings and needs and try to help.  At stage 4, in contrast, the respondent becomes more broadly concerned with society as a whole.  Now the emphasis is on obeying laws, respecting authority, and performing one’s duties so that the social order is maintained.  In response to the Heinz story, many subjects say they understand that Heinz’s motives were good, but they cannot condone the theft.  What would happen if we all started breaking the laws whenever we felt we had a good reason?  The result would be chaos; society couldn’t function.  As one subject explained:  “I don’t want to sound like Spiro Agnew, law and order and wave the flag, but if everybody did as he wanted to do, set up his own beliefs as to right and wrong, then I think you would have chaos.  The only thing I think we have in civilization nowadays is some sort of legal structure which people are sort of bound to follow.  Society needs a centralizing framework.”

Because stage 4 subjects make moral decisions from the perspective of society as a whole, they think from a full-fledge member-of-society perspective.

Stage 1 children also generally oppose stealing because it breaks the law.  Superficially stage 1 and 4 subjects are giving the same response, so we must probe into the reasoning behind the overt response.  Stage 1 children say, “It’s wrong to steal” and “It’s against the law,” but they cannot elaborate any further, except to say that stealing can get a person jailed.  Stage 4 respondents have a conception of the function of laws for society as a whole—a conception which far exceeds the grasp of the younger child.

Level III. Postconventional Morality

Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights.

At stage 4, people want to keep society functioning.  However, a smoothly functioning society is not necessarily a good one.  A totalitarian society might be well-organized, but it is hardly the moral ideal.  At stage 5, people begin to ask, what makes for a good society?  They begin to think about society in a very theoretical way, stepping back from their own society and considering the rights and values that a society ought to uphold.  They then evaluate existing societies in terms of these prior considerations.  They are said to take a “prior-to-society” perspective.

Stage 5 respondents basically believe that a good society is best conceived as a social contract into which people freely enter to work toward the benefit of all.  They recognize that different social groups within a society will have different values, but they believe that all rational people would agree on two points.  First they would all want certain basic rights, such as liberty and life, to be protected.  Second, they would want some democratic procedures for changing unfair law and for improving society.

In response to the Heinz dilemma, stage 5 respondents make it clear that they do not generally favor breaking laws; laws are social contacts that we agree to uphold until we can change them by democratic means.  Nevertheless, the wife’s right to live is a moral right that must be protected.  Thus stage 5 respondents sometimes defend Heinz’s theft in strong language:  “It is the husband’s duty to save his wife.  The fact that her life is in danger transcends every other standard you might use to judge his action.  Life is more important than property.”

This young woman went on to say that “from a moral standpoint” Heinz should save the life of even a stranger, since to be consistent, the value of a life means any life.  When asked if the judge should punish Heinz, she replied:  “Usually the moral and legal standpoints coincide.  Here they conflict.  The judge should weigh the moral standpoint more heavily but preserve the legal law in punishing Heinz lightly.”

Stage 5 subjects talk about morality and rights that take some priority over particular laws.  Kohlberg insists, however, that we do not judge people to be at stage 5 merely from their verbal labels.  We need to look at their social perspective and mode of reasoning.  At stage 4 subjects frequently talk about the right to life, but for them this right is legitimized by the authority of their social or religious group (the Bible, etc.).  Presumably, if their group valued property over life, they would too.  At stage 5 people are making more of an independent effort to think out what any society ought to value.  They often reason, for example, that property has little meaning without life.  They are trying to determine logically what a society ought to be like and what values take precedence.

Stage 6. Universal Principles.

Stage 5 respondents are working toward a conception of the good society.  They suggest that we need to protect certain individual rights and settle disputes through democratic processes.  However, democratic processes alone do not always result in outcomes that we intuitively sense are just.  A majority may vote for a law that hinders a minority.  Thus, Kohlberg believes that there must be a higher stage which defines the principles by which we achieve justice.

His conception of justice follows that of the philosophers Kant and Rawls, as well as great moral leaders such as Gandhi and King.  According to these people, the principles of justice require us to treat the claims of all parties in an impartial manner, respecting the basic dignity, of all people as individuals.  The principles of justice are therefore universal: they apply to all.  Thus we would not vote for a law that aids some people but hurts others.  The principles of justice guide us toward decisions based on an equal respect for all.

In actual practice, we can reach just decisions by looking at a situation through one another’s eyes.  In the Heinz dilemma, this would mean that all parties—the druggist, Heinz, and his wife—take roles of the other.  To do this in an impartial manner, people can assume a “veil of ignorance”, acting as if they do not know which role they will eventually occupy.  If the druggist did this, even he would recognize that life must take priority over property; for he wouldn’t want to risk finding himself in the wife’s shoes with property valued over life.  Thus, they would all agree that the wife must be saved—this would be the fair solution.  Such a solution requires not only impartiality, but the principle that everyone is give full and equal respect.  If the wife were considered of less value than the other, a just solution could not be reached.

Kohlberg stopped scoring subjects at stage 6 because he and other researchers had not found subjects who consistently reasoned at this stage.  But one issue that distinguishes stage 4 from 6 is civil disobedience.  Stage 5 would be more hesitant to endorse civil disobedience because of its commitment to the social contract and to changing laws through democratic agreements.  Only when an individual right is clearly at stake does violating the law seem justified.  At stage 6 a commitment to justice makes the rationale for civil disobedience stronger and broader.  King argued that laws are only valid insofar as they are grounded in justice, and that a commitment to justice carries with it an obligation to disobey unjust laws.  King also recognized the general need for laws and democratic processes and therefore he was willing to accept the penalties for his actions.

One critic of Kohlberg to note is Carol Gilligan.  She claims that in using the principle of justice he has negated the idea of caring as an equally valid higher principle.  In Kohlberg’s scheme, caring and relationship tending would be left at stage 3 when in fact it should be part of 4, 5 and 6.  As a member of the 1^st class at the Institute, we went to Harvard to meet with Kohlberg and learn about his work first hand.  Since Gilligan was one of his students I asked him about her accusation.  This very gentle and unassuming man said he was very hurt by this controversy.  If she had only talked with him about it he could have made corrections.  He thought justice included the idea of caring and when I agreed that it was very much more cold and objective than caring, he agreed he needed to work on this problem.

Kohlberg’s stages meet the criteria for true mental stages in that they are:

1) qualitatively different ways of thinking

2) are structured wholes

3) progress in an invariant sequence

4) are cross-cultural universals.

Not all researchers agree that his stages have proven to have all these criteria, but until anything is conclusive, we can still see the theory as a valid description of moral development. 

People don’t hop easily and fully from one stage to another.  Conflict of opinion which produces a disequilibrium that needs resolution, moves a person to think on a different level, but this does not immediately apply to all other issues.  Thus people enter a stage and as they apply more things to this new way of thinking they gradually become solidified in the new stage, only to be confronted with challenges that push them out of this comfort zone into another one.  Obviously some people get stuck at earlier stages and resist any temptation or prodding to move on. 

Hopefully humanists are dedicated to their own progress in moral development.   However, I must say that I have seen many humanists who would consider themselves to be stage 5 and 6 people but are so strong about the “right” opinions they have developed that they have little regard for those who think differently.  This makes me wonder whether these considered opinions take into account a true respect for other individuals and would therefore, place these folks at an earlier stage of development than they would like to admit.

SOURCES:

Robert Kegan, (1982). The Evolving Self. Harvard

W.C. Crain. (1985). Theories of Development. Prentice-Hall. pp. 118-136

Mary Elizabeth Murray, “Overview of Moral Development and Moral Education”,  http://tigger.uic.edu/-Inucci/MoralEd/overviewtext.html

William Puka, “Moral Development” (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Carol Gilligan. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological theory and Women’s Development. Harvard

Carol Tavris. (1992) “The Mismeasure of Woman”. Simon and Schuster

Lawrence Kohlberg. (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development. Harper and Row